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A ‘SUBSTANTIAL AND MATERIAL’
REFINEMENT OF TINKER
Larissa M. Lozano*

INTRODUCTION
On January 29, 2010, students belonging to Relentless, a non-school
affiliated religious youth group, passed out 2-inch, realistic rubber-fetus dolls to their
peers at Goddard High School and Roswell High School.1 Attached to each doll was
a card that contained the Relentless logo, a statement that the doll was a realistic
depiction of a 12 week-old fetus, information about the county pregnancy center, and
a Bible verse.2 Relentless did not obtain pre-approval for distribution.3 Members of
Relentless offered a doll to each student they encountered.4 Students who chose not
to accept a doll at either school were not bothered or forced to do so.
On prior occasions, Relentless had passed out items at school without preapproval and had never been sanctioned.5 Yet on January 29, 2010, Roswell
Independent School District6 (“District”) stopped the group’s distribution and
confiscated every doll.7 Administrators8 stated that Relentless’ distribution was
speech that “[w]ould cause a substantial disruption or a material interference9 with
the normal operation of the school or school activities.”10
Members of Relentless filed suit against the District, arguing that their First
Amendment rights had been violated.11 Faced with a First Amendment challenge,
* University of New Mexico School of Law J.D. Candidate 2016. First, I would like to thank my
parents for their constant and unconditional support of my academic, professional and personal endeavors.
I also want to extend my gratitude to Professor Sidhu for his kind feedback and guidance on how to
transition my thoughts into persuasive legal arguments. Finally, a sincere thank you to Judge Bustamante
and Michael Jasso for their insight and constructive edits.
1. Taylor v. Roswell Indep. Sch. Dist., 713 F.3d 25, 29–30 (10th Cir. 2013). Goddard High School
and Roswell High School are located in Roswell, New Mexico.
2. Id. at 30 (The verse read, “For you formed my inward parts; You wove me in my mother[‘]s
womb. I will give thanks to You, for I am fearfully and wonderfully made; Wonderful are your works,
And my soul knows it very well. Psalms 139:13–14.”).
3. Id. at 30.
4. Id.
5. Id. at 29.
6. Both Roswell High School and Goddard High School are part of Roswell Independent School
District, also referred to as “District.”
7. Taylor, 713 F.3d at 31.
8. Administrators are classified as superintendents, principals, and vice-principals.
9. (emphasis added).
10. Taylor, 713 F.3d at 32–33; Roswell Independent School District, 5000 Pupil Personnel: Q.
Distribution of Non School Sponsored Literature §2(a) 48 (2014).
11. Taylor, 713 F.3d at 33.
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administrators were unable to articulate a coherent standard of what constituted a
“substantial disruption or a material interference.”12 Despite the District’s use of an
unspecified and inconsistently applied standard, the magistrate judge held in favor
of the schools. On appeal, the Tenth Circuit upheld the magistrate. 13 In doing so, the
Circuit affirmed that a significant amount of deference is given to administrative
judgment to accurately determine a substantial and material disruption.14
As Taylor exemplifies, the substantial and material disruption standard is
problematic. It is ill-defined, vague, and open to wide interpretation.15 Courts using
this standard have routinely remained silent on specific criteria that constitute a
substantial disruption.16 Instead, courts rely on schools to decide what will negatively
affect their environments and cause disruption.17
The lack of delineated criteria frustrates students’ First Amendment rights
and permits obscure school policies. Allowing administrators to determine what
constitutes a substantial and material disruption without distinct and pre-set guidance
promotes subjective and inconsistent application. First Amendment rights are
constitutional liberties that should not be subjected to arbitrary criteria that fluctuate
with different administrators. A clear and succinct policy would lead to less
controversy and fewer lawsuits against school districts, allowing administrators to
devote more time, attention, and money to other issues.
This note proposes that the substantial disruption and material interference
standard be narrowed and specified for consistent and predictable applicability. The
analysis focuses on disruptive student school speech generally and does not
differentiate between prior restraint and subsequent punishment.18 This note does not
address all of the Tenth Circuit’s holdings in Taylor.19 The analysis is limited to the

12. Appellants’ Opening Brief at 29–32; Taylor v. Roswell Indep. Sch. Dist., 713 F.3d 25 (10th Cir.
2013) (No. 11–2242) (Administrators stated that policies were left vague to allow “wiggle room”. When
asked what “non-school sponsored literature” covered, Goddard Assistant Principal Edgett,
Superintendent Gottlieb, and Roswell Assistant Principal Kakusa each provided different and distinct
definitions.); (The “substantial disruption and material interference” standard was set forth by the
Supreme Court in Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District, as an attempt to balance
student free speech with schools’ need for order and discipline.) Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Com. Sch.
Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969). (“Substantial disruption or material interference” will also be referred to as
the “substantial and material disruption standard”).
13. Taylor, 713 F.3d at 29, 36–39.
14. See Burnside v. Byars, 363 F.2d 744, 748 (5th Cir. 1966); see also Terry B. Light, Constitutional
Law – Right of Free Speech – Tinker v. Independent Community School District, 89 S.Ct. 733 (1969), 11
WM. & MARY L. REV. 275, 276–277 (1969).
15. Allison G. Kort, An Imminent Substantial Disruption: Towards A Uniform Standard For
Balancing the Rights of Students to Speak and the Rights of Administrators to Discipline, __ DARTMOUTH
L.J. __ (2014, forthcoming).
16. Id. at 2; Light, supra, note 14, at 276.
17. See Sypniewski v. Warren Hills Reg’l Bd. of Educ., 307 F.3d 243, 267–268 (3rd Cir. 2002); see
also, Scott v. Sch. Bd. of Alachua Cnty., 324 F.3d 1246, 1247 (11th Cir. 2003); Erwin Chemerinsky,
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES, 1194, (4th ed. 2011); Light, supra, note 14 at 276.
18. This note does not discuss internet-based speech or speech that originates off campus and is
brought onto campus by a third party. Speech that falls under the Fraser, Hazelwood or Morse is also
excluded from this analysis.
19. The Tenth Circuit held in Taylor that “1) students’ claims were not moot; 2) officials did not
violate students’ free speech rights; 3) district’s pre-approval policy did not violate students’ free rights
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Circuit’s use and reasoning of Tinker as applied to substantial and material
disruption.
Part I of this note discusses the substantial and material disruption standard
set forth in Tinker and how the Tenth Circuit applied that standard in Taylor. Part II
examines how lower courts have broadened the threshold for restriction based on
Tinker by relying on past incidents of disruptive speech in schools or by applying an
unpredictable ad hoc analysis. This section also discusses how the Tenth Circuit in
Taylor misapplied and conflated the broadened Tinker standard. Part III proposes
refining the substantial disruption and material interference standard to be
predictable and more beneficial to both students and schools. The proposal suggests
a balancing test of four factors: 1) speech intended to isolate, 2) magnitude of peer
reaction, 3) location of speech, and 4) duration (of disruption). Part IV applies the
proposed standard to the facts of Taylor to demonstrate how well-defined criteria
would have affected the New Mexico magistrate and Tenth Circuit’s holding.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Statement of the Case
Relentless in Roswell (“Relentless”)20 was a youth group associated with a
local Roswell church, Church on the Move.21 Plaintiffs were members of the group
and students at Roswell High School and Goddard High School who frequently
expressed religious ideas at school.22 In late 2009, Relentless began a program to
“put God back into the schools.”23 Each week, group members would distribute
items at Goddard and Roswell.24 The first two distributions were food25 and drink26
that were not explicitly linked to religion.27 Later distributions of candy canes and
“affirmation rocks” were explicitly associated with religious sentiment.28 On all of
these occasions, Relentless did not obtain school permission for their
distributions,29 nor did administrators confiscate the items or reprimand the
students.30 However, on January 29, 2010, the District halted Relentless’
distribution and confiscated the group’s possessions based on policies that had
previously been unenforced.31
under Free Speech Clause . . . 5) officials did not violate students’ rights under Free Exercise Clause; and
6) officials did not violate students’ equal protection rights. Taylor, 713 F.3d at 26.
20. Appellants’ Opening Brief at 2; Taylor v. Roswell Indep. Sch. Dist, 713 F.3d 25 (10th Cir. 2013)
(No. 11–2242).
21. Taylor, 713 F.3d at 29.
22. Id.; Goddard High School is also referred to as “Goddard.” Roswell High School is also referred
to as “Roswell.”
23. Id. at 29.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 30 (220 chicken salad sandwiches for faculty).
26. Id. (Hot chocolate for both faculty and students).
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 29–31.
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Before classes commenced on January 29, 2010, members of Relentless
passed out 2-inch, realistic looking rubber fetus dolls at their respective schools.32
Goddard’s Assistant Principal, Brian Luck, arrived at school and upon noticing the
dolls, asked other administrators if Relentless had permission for the distribution.33
Another Assistant Principal, Michelle Edgett, responded that there was no preapproval for the distribution and that the dolls should be confiscated.34 While Mr.
Luck was on his way to stop the distribution, he observed several students destroying
and throwing the dolls in the hallway.35 A group of female students also stopped him
to voice their exasperation.36 Mr. Luck subsequently notified Relentless that the
distribution was being stopped and he confiscated the remaining dolls.37 As the
morning progressed, incidents of class disruption and student misconduct with the
dolls were observed.38 Reports indicated that students were throwing doll heads at
their peers, sticking the heads to the ceilings of classrooms and lighting the heads on
fire.39 The administration announced over the school speaker system that non-school
related items were not to be distributed and all dolls should be confiscated.40 An
administrator from Goddard then called Roswell’s principal, Ruben Bolaños, to
inquire if similar events had occurred.41
The Goddard administrator’s phone call ignited the Roswell
administration’s attention to Relentless’ doll distribution.42 Principal Bolaños was
not on campus when he received the phone call, but immediately instructed the onduty security guards at Roswell to confiscate the dolls if they were a “disruption to
the educational process.”43 Confiscation later began when a security guard observed
several instances of doll heads being ripped off, thrown around, and repurposed.44 In
response to the observed disruption, a teacher at Roswell held the remaining,
undistributed dolls in her classroom until it was determined whether the distribution
could continue.45 Administrators at both schools justified the censorship by stating

32. Id. at 30.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 30–31.
36. Id. at 31.
37. Id.
38. Appellees Roswell Independent School District and Superintendent Michael Gottlieb’s Answer
Brief, at 12–13; Taylor v. Roswell Indep. Sch. Dist., 713 F.3d 25 (10th Cir. 2013) (No. 11–2242).
39. Id. at 13.
40. Id. at 13–14.
41. Taylor, 713 F.3d at 31.
42. Memorandum of Law in Support of Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary Judgment, at ¶ 56, Taylor v.
Roswell Indep. Sch. Dist., 713 F.3d 25 (10th Cir. 2013) (No. 11–2242).
43. Taylor, 713 F.3d at 31.
44. Appellees Roswell Independent School District and Superintendent Michael Gottlieb’s Answer
Brief, at 14, Taylor v. Roswell Indep. Sch. Dist., 713 F.3d 25 (10th Cir. 2013) (No. 11–2242) (Students
used the plastic doll parts in a variety of ways including as projectiles, pencil toppers and a student
attaching a head to his groin area.).
45. Memorandum of Law in Support of Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary Judgment, at ¶ 57, Taylor v.
Roswell Indep. Sch. Dist., 713 F.3d 25 (10th Cir. 2013) (No. 11–2242).
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that Relentless’ actions were creating substantial disruptions in violation of District
policy.46
When Relentless began weekly distributions at Roswell and Goddard, the
school district had two policies requiring pre-approval for non-school related
distribution.47 The first policy, Policy 7110, was a formal, written policy, that
“reserves the right” for a school to examine and approve promotional materials
seeking to be distributed on school property or at school affiliated events.48 The
second pre-approval policy was unwritten and required students to seek prior
approval on distribution of more than 10 copies of all non-school affiliated
materials.49 Four months after the doll distribution, the unwritten policy was
formalized as Policy 5195.50 Section 2(a) of Policy 5195 states that non-school
related material may be denied distribution if it is determined that doing so “[w]ould
cause a substantial disruption of or a material interference with the normal operation
of the school or school activities.”51 Policy 5195 also contains an appeal process by
which students denied distribution may have their materials reconsidered.52
Seeking injunctive relief, the student plaintiffs brought three counts against
Roswell Independent School District.53 The first count contained two claims: a) a
facial challenge against the constitutionality of the policies regarding prior restraint,
vagueness, and overbreadth, and b) violation of free speech.54 The second count was
a hybrid claim alleging that the censorship of the doll distribution was a violation of
free speech.55 The third count claimed a violation of the Equal Protection Clause.56
Both parties filed for summary judgment.57 The magistrate judge granted summary
judgment for the District on all claims.58
B.

Rationale

The Tenth Circuit reviewed the lower court’s grant of summary judgment
de novo.59 Except for the hybrid aspect of claim two, each argument raised in the
lower court was appealed.60 Acknowledging that Mr. Luck’s initial reasoning for

46. Id. at 34.
47. Id. at 30.
48. Roswell Independent School District, 7000 School Community Relations: A. Advertising;
Distribution of Printed Material 2 (2014).
49. Taylor, 713 F.3d at 32.
50. Id.
51. Roswell Independent School District, 5000 Pupil Personnel: I. General: Q. Distribution of Non
School Sponsored Literature 48 (2014).
52. Id.
53. Taylor, 713 F.3d at 33.
54. Id.
55. Id. (the hybrid theory was later taken out of the plaintiff’s free exercise argument).
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 34.
60. Id. at 33–34.
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halting distribution was vague,61 the Circuit upheld the magistrate’s ruling of
summary judgment for the District on all claims.62
C.

Legal Background
1.

Categorization of Speech Under the First Amendment

The First Amendment of the United States Constitution provides the right
to freedom of speech.63 Speech that occurs on government property is categorized
into three groups based on the type of location: a public forum, a limited public
forum, or a nonpublic forum.64 A public forum is an area that is customarily available
for public use.65 A limited public forum is not usually available to the public, but
may temporarily be open for public use.66 A non-public forum is generally not open
to public expression.67 Public schools are classified as a non-public forum.68
Regulations in a nonpublic-forum are permissible under three conditions:691)
content-neutral time, place, or manner restrictions, 2) if the speech falls into a
narrowly-defined category that was created in response to a compelling interest, or
3) if the regulation is reasonable and viewpoint neutral.70 The government may not
restrict speech because of disagreement with a particular viewpoint.71
2.

Schools as a Unique Public Forum

“It can hardly be argued that either students or teachers shed their
constitutional right to freedom of speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate.”72
This oft-cited quote from Tinker v. Des Moines Independent School District
highlights the proposition that school speech should not and cannot be fully regulated
by school administrators.73 The impossibility of the Court to consider every
individual school’s unique characteristics and mission makes it difficult to create a
uniform speech regulation for administrators to most effectively run their schools.74

61. Id. at 38–39.
62. Id. at 54.
63. U.S. CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech . . . .”).
64. John E. Nowak & Ronald D. Rotunda, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 1262 § 16.1(f) (8th ed. 2010).
65. Lyrissa Lidsky, Public Forum 2.0, 91 B.U. L. REV. 1975, 1981–1982 (2011); See, Nowak, supra,
note 64 at 1262 § 16.1(f) (e.g. city street).
66. See 16A AM. JUR. 2D CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, § 542; see also, Nowak, supra, note 64 at 1262 §
16.1(f) (e.g. a university meeting hall).
67. See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, supra, note 66 at § 543; see also, Nowak, supra, note 64 at 1263 §
16.1(f).
68. Nowak, supra, note 64 at 1263 § 16.1(f).
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Nowak, supra, note 64 at 1263 § 16.1(f).
72. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Com. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969).
73. Id. at 511.
74. See Nuxoll v. Indian Prairie Sch. Dist. #204, 523 F.3d 668, 671 (7th Cir. 2008).
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Functioning in loco parentis,75 a school must be able to correct for an array
of problems.76 If negative conduct and speech remains undisciplined, schools lose
their ability to effectively educate pupils.77 Administrators need to provide discipline
and keep an orderly environment conducive to learning.78 Speech may solicit
reactions from other students, creating a tension filled environment.79 School
officials emphasize the need to impose discipline for inappropriate student speech to
minimize commotion that causes disturbance to class instruction, takes away the
focus of pupils, and disrupts the purpose of the institution.80
Equally, students retain a right of proper notice regarding the realm of
acceptable speech and should not be subject to arbitrary discipline.81 Schools serve
to educate the nation’s youth to become productive, industrious, and freethinking
citizens.82 “The vigilant protection of constitutional freedoms is nowhere more vital
than in the community of American schools.”83
Schools need to educate their students and maintain authority while
simultaneously respecting their students’ constitutional rights.84 Balancing these two
interests at issue should be reasonable and “contribute[] to the maintenance of order
and decorum within the educational system.”85
3.

Establishment of Tinker’s “Substantial and Material Disruption”

In early December 1965, the Des Moines school administration became
aware of students’ plans to protest the Vietnam War by wearing black armbands to
school.86 In response, on December 14, 1965, the school enacted a policy prohibiting
the armband display.87 Despite the regulation, three students wore protest armbands
to school.88 A few students made adverse remarks in the school hallways to the three
armband clad students, but no violence resulted and there was no sign of classroom

75. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 385 (4th ed. 2011) (defined as, “Of, relating to, or acting as a
temporary guardian or caretaker of a child, taking on all or some of the responsibilities of a parent.”).
76. Bethel School Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 684–686 (1986).
77. Nuxoll, 523 F.3d at 672.
78. Fraser, 478 U.S. at 690 (Marshall, J., dissenting); Scott v. Sch. Bd. of Alachua Cnty., 324 F.3d
1246, 1247 (11th Cir. 2003).
79. Blackwell v. Issaquena Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 363 F.2d 749, 751–752 (5th Cir. 1966).
80. See Burnside v. Byars, 363 F.2d 744, 746–747 (5th Cir. 1966); see also Terry B. Light,
Constitutional Law – Right of Free Speech – Tinker v. Independent Community School District, 89 S.Ct.
733 (1969), 11 WM. & MARY L. REV. 275, 275–276 (1969).
81. Fraser, 478 U.S. at. 691 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
82. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Com. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 507 (1969) (emphasis added)
(quoting West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943)).
83. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 512 (quoting Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 487 (1960)); see Terry B.
Light, Constitutional Law – Right of Free Speech – Tinker v. Independent Community School District, 89
S.Ct. 733 (1969), 11 WM. & MARY L. REV. 275, 278 (1969) (indicating that children’s right to free speech
may not be equal to an adult’s right to free speech).
84. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 507.
85. Burnside, 363 F.2d at 748.
86. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 504.
87. Id.
88. Id.
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disruption.89 Referring to the standard delineated in Burnside v. Byars,90 the United
States District Court dismissed the complaint.91 On appeal, the Eighth Circuit heard
the case en banc and affirmed.92 However, the United States Supreme Court
emphasized that conduct which “materially disrupts classwork or involves
substantial disorder or invasion to the rights of others is, of course, not immunized
by the constitutional guarantee of freedom of speech.”93 The Court further reasoned
that a regulation of students is unconstitutional unless it could be shown that “the
students’ activities would materially and substantially disrupt the work and discipline
of the school.”94 Mere fear of disturbance is not enough, but a specific reason to
anticipate the interference must be present.95
Courts later expanded Tinker to provide that in determining the likelihood
of a material and substantial disruption, schools may consider foreseeability of
disruption by looking at previous school disturbances arising out of similar speech
or conduct.96 A well-founded and explicit connection between the prior speech and
present speech must be established to justify fear of a material and substantial
disruption or interference with the rights of others.97 A distinction is not drawn
between disruption caused directly by those creating the speech and disruption
caused by the conduct of third parties reacting to the speech.98
The United States has developed three exceptions to the “substantial and
material disruption” standard post-Tinker.99 The first exception to Tinker was Bethel
School District v. Fraser which involved a student government election speech with
sexual double entendre.100 The Court reasoned that lewd and vulgar student speech
threatened to undermine the school and may be subject to sanction by
administrators.101 In the second case, Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier,
students brought an action alleging a violation of their First Amendment rights when
a school principal vetoed and deleted two pages from a student-run, schoolsponsored newspaper.102 The Court held that administrators may regulate schoolsponsored student speech.103 Most recently, in Morse v. Frederick, a student unfurled
a banner reading “BONG HiTS 4 JESUS” at a school sponsored event and the Court

89. Id. at 508.
90. Burnside v. Byars, 363 F.2d 744, 749 (5th Cir. 1966) (holding that schools can not infringe on
student speech if the speech does not “materially and substantially” interfere with operation of the school).
91. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 504.
92. Id. at 505.
93. Id. at 513.
94. Id.; see Terry B. Light, Constitutional Law – Right of Free Speech – Tinker v. Independent
Community School District, 89 S.Ct. 733 (1969), 11 WM. & MARY L. REV. 275, 277 (1969).
95. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 508.
96. Sypniewski v. Warren Hills Reg’l Bd. of Educ., 307 F.3d 243, 255 (3rd Cir. 2002).
97. Id. at 257; cf. Saxe v. State Coll. Area Sch. Dist., 240 F.3d 200, 217 (3rd Cir. 2001).
98. See Jews for Jesus v. Mass. Bay Transp. Auth., 984 F.2d 1319, 1324–1325 (1st Cir. 1993).
99. Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675 (1986); Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier,
484 U.S. 260 (1988); Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393 (2007).
100. Fraser, 478 U.S. at 677–678.
101. Id. at 685–686.
102. Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 262.
103. Id. at 273.
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held that student speech advocating illegal drug use is improper and subject to
sanction.104
4.

Summary of the Opinion

In Taylor, the Tenth Circuit used the Tinker substantial and material
disruption standard to analyze Relentless’ distribution.105 The Circuit ruled that there
was a greater possibility of disturbance with rubber figurines than the possibility of
disturbance due to armbands.106 When student speech is active, rather than passive,107
restrictions are more likely to be appropriate.108 Emphasizing the series of
disturbances made at the two high schools, the Circuit stated the District had a special
interest in protecting students and the educational purpose of the school.109
Although Mr. Luck110 may have stopped distribution before a substantial
and material disruption took place, the Circuit reasoned that a small period of
unjustified censorship did not outweigh a reasonable forecast of substantial
disruption since disturbances eventually transpired.111 As for the confiscation at
Roswell, the dolls were appropriately confiscated only when the school security
guard identified disturbances.112
The Tenth Circuit further held that the language in Policy 5195, section
2(a), limits school discretion to objective reasonableness.113 The school policy in this
case, was equal to the U.S. Supreme Court’s promulgated standard in Tinker, where
speech can be constitutionally censored if it is reasonably forecast to cause a
substantial and material disruption.114 Furthermore, Policy 5195 contained sufficient
procedural safeguards to protect student rights and guard against complete
administrative control.115
II. ARGUMENT
Ironically, because disruption did not occur in Tinker, the opinion fails to
identify specific criteria that constitute a substantial and material disruption.116
Continued lack of guidance for applicability of the standard has led lower courts to
give greater deference to school judgment while still avoiding specifying and
narrowing the standard.

104. Morse, 551 U.S. at 396–397, 410.
105. Taylor v. Roswell Indep. Sch. Dist., 713 F.3d 25, 36 (10th Cir. 2013); supra, note 18.
106. Id. at 38; see, Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Com. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
107. Passive speech is defined by the court silent expression. Inferring the counter principal, active
speech is encompasses verbal or physical statements.
108. Taylor, 713 F.3d at 37.
109. Id. at 38.
110. Mr. Luck is Goddard High School’s Assistant Principal.
111. Taylor, 713 F.3d at 39.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 45–46.
114. Id. at 46.
115. Id. at 47.
116. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Com. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 514 (1969); Karp v. Becken, 477
F.2d 171, 174 (9th Cir. 1973).
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Foreseeability of Disruption

In giving schools greater ability to control their environments, courts have
read Tinker to implicitly allow restrictions before speech has occurred.117 Therefore,
when disruption in the schools setting is reasonably foreseeable, administrations may
take preventative action.118 Restricted speech and the anticipated disruption must be
explicitly linked119 and sufficiently similar to past events.120 To demonstrate this
connection, administrators must indicate that the category of speech has caused
disruption in the past,121 that speech may incite students to rebel against the function
of a school,122 or that it may lead to student violence.123
In Taylor, the Tenth Circuit misapplied the standards for disruptive student
speech by using a hybrid of foreseeability and substantial and material disruption.
The Circuit reasoned that a variety of situational factors,124 allowed for a reasonable
forecast of disruption. 125 This approach is a gross deviation from the established
practice of foreseeability analysis. The court failed to demonstrate previous history
of disruptive incidents, fear of violence, or the potential of the school losing its
functional purpose. The Circuit did not attempt to make a lesser connection of
similarity between Relentless’ distributions and previous disruptive conduct. Instead,
the analysis reasons that a disruption was foreseeable because disruptive events
eventually transpired.126 This argument is flawed as it ignores the prerequisite that a
demonstration of reason to censor speech needs to be shown before the speech is
restricted.127 The Circuit’s reasoning embraces exactly what Tinker warned against:
regulation based on an “undifferentiated fear or apprehension of disturbance.”128

117. McAllum v. Cash, 585 F.3d 214, 223 (5th Cir. 2009) (citing Tinker, 393 U.S. 503, at 514 (1969));
Lowery v. Euverard, 497 F.3d 584, 593 (6th Cir. 2007).
118. McAllum, 585 F.3d at 223.
119. Id.; Sypniewski v. Warren Hills Reg’l Bd. of Educ., 307 F.3d 243, 257 (3rd Cir. 2002).
120. Sypniewski, 307 F.3d at 256 (holding that the term “redneck” was not sufficiently related to both
the term “hick” and the Confederate flag which had caused previous disruptive incidents).
121. See McAllum, 585 F.3d at 222; see also, Scott v. Sch. Bd. of Alachua Cnty., 324 F.3d 1246, 1249
(11th Cir. 2003); Defoe ex. rel Defoe v. Spiva, 625 F.3d 324, 327 (6th Cir. 2010); West v. Derby Unified
Sch. Dist. No. 260, 206 F.3d 1358, 1362 (10th Cir. 2000); Sypniewski, 307 F.3d at 256, 247 (holding that
without a history of past disruption, restrictions are invalid).
122. Nuxoll v. Indian Prairie Sch. Dist. #204, 523 F.3d 668, 674 (7th Cir. 2008) (“[I]f there is reason
to think that a particular type of speech will lead to . . . other symptoms of a sick school--symptoms
therefore of a substantial disruption--the school can forbid the speech.”).
123. Karp v. Becken, 477 F.2d 171, 176 (9th Cir. 1973).
124. The Tenth Circuit relied on five factors to indicate a reasonably forecast of disruption: 1) The
speech by Relentless was not silent or passive, 2) items remained in the hands of students throughout the
day, 3) number of items created the potential for substantial disruption, 4) the dolls were made of rubber,
which could be pulled apart, and the 5) small size of the dolls. Taylor v. Roswell Indep. Sch. Dist., 713
F.3d 25, 38 (10th Cir. 2013).
125. Id.
126. Id. at 39.
127. There must be a valid reason to censor speech before restrictions are implemented. Without a prerequisite reason, speech is restricted without cause, creating an explicit and apparent violation of the First
Amendment right to free speech.
128. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Com. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 508 (1969).
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Materialization of Disruption

When disruption has progressed past foreseeability and materialized, the
court relies on fact-specific scenarios.129 The purpose of fact-specific analysis is to
give administrations the capability to deal with a wide-array of situations or potential
problems.130 The result of this analysis is an ad-hoc standard that fluctuates with
circumstances. With fact-dependent analysis, teachers are unable to uniformly agree
on what constitutes a disruption, as evidenced by Taylor.131 This impreciseness
creates uncertainty amongst students as to the breadth of tolerable free speech. In
effect, a fickle standard exists, allowing teachers to freely regulate anything they feel
is improper.
The substantial and material disruption standard has been criticized as
insufficient when terms are undefined132 or ill-defined, leading to inconsistent
interpretation. Just as foreseeable disruption requires substantive and actual
reasoning to restrict speech, actual disruption should be held to the same level of
scrutiny. The Tenth Circuit has confirmed that regulation of speech must be based
on concrete evidence on definitive criteria.133 Lack of definitive reason for restriction
goes beyond the standard articulated in Tinker.134 The failure to illustrate how to
interpret substantial disruption or material interference makes it difficult for an
administrator to reasonably analyze a situation for disruption.135 Unclear restrictions
create problems instead of fixing them.136
The Tenth Circuit court briefly addresses the actual disruptions that took
place in the school environment in Taylor as a result of the doll distribution,
“including substantial disruption to classroom instruction, damage to school property
. . . and risks to student safety . . . .137 Using the identified disruptions, the court held
that the instances were enough to meet the threshold of material and substantial.138
However, a close look at the record reveals that the administration itself was unable
to articulate a specific standard to determine when speech would be prohibited.139
Without a recognizable standard, the possibility that students’ rights will be greatly

129. See LaVine v. Blaine Sch. Dist., 257 F.3d 981, 989 (9th Cir. 2001); see also Pinard v. Clatskanie
Sch. Dist., 467 F.3d 755, 770 (9th Cir. 2006) (“[T]he First Amendment is properly read to permit a school
district’s ‘reasonable regulation of speech connected activities in carefully restricted circumstances.’”)
(citing Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Com. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969)).
130. Baker v. Downey City Bd. of Educ., 307 F.Supp. 517, 527–528 (C.D. Ca. 1969); see Nuxoll, 523
F.3d at 675 (“But context is vital.”).
131. Appellants’ Opening Brief at 18, Taylor v. Roswell Indep. Sch. Dist., 713 F.3d 25 (10th Cir.
2013) (No. 11–2242).
132. Saxe v. State Coll. Area Sch. Dist., 240 F.3d 200, 217 (3rd Cir. 2001).
133. Id. at 212 (citing West v. Derby Unified Sch. Dist. No. 260, 206 F.3d 1358 (10th Cir. 2000) (West
held that history of tension provided reason to anticipate disruption).
134. Id. at 217.
135. Nitzberg v. Parks, 525 F.2d 378, 383 (4th Cir. 1975).
136. Id. at 384.
137. Taylor v. Roswell Indep. Sch. Dist., 713 F.3d 25, 38 (10th Cir. 2013).
138. Id. at 39.
139. Appellants’ Opening Brief at 29–30, Taylor v. Roswell Indep. Sch. Dist., 713 F.3d 25 (10th Cir.
2013) (No. 11–2242).
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inhibited is valid. Students who are afraid of being reprimanded for possibly
unprotected speech might become restricted and confined in their thinking.140
The court addresses the possibility that vice-principal Luck may have
stopped the distributions without justification.141 However, the court characterizes
the potential administrative mistake as short term, lasting between a few minutes and
two hours.142 What the court fails to address is that improper speech restriction,
regardless of duration, is a violation of students’ First Amendment rights.
The court rests their opinion on the notion that because disruptive incidents
eventually transpired, restrictions against Relentless were justifiable. In doing so, the
court looks at the final result rather than the steps taken to reach that point of
restriction. By taking this approach, the court ignores the protections that should be
afforded to student speech. Although distribution policies were in place, they
remained unenforced and there was no way for Relentless to predict when the school
would alter their enforcement decision.
In their analysis, the Circuit confuses the purpose of the Tinker.
Foreseeability and the substantial and material disruption standard are distinct and
cannot be combined. Furthermore, the substantial and material disruption standard
should not be applied as a subjective ad hoc analysis. In applying a situational
analysis, students remain unclear on prohibited speech.
C.

Court Guidance for Clarifying Tinker

Several opinions have offered criteria that, if adopted, would assist in
clarifying the meaning of material and substantial disruption.143 These propositions
contemplate a standard that is narrow enough to give students adequate notice and
promote freethinking,144 while maintaining flexibility for administrators to address a
wide array of potential situations. These suggestions include whether previous
negative incidents regarding the speech have occurred145 and the magnitude of peer
reaction.146
The use of prior negative experiences to regulate student speech would
require administrators to provide concrete and substantive evidence of similar
incidents as support for their restrictive regulations.147 This criterion has the added
benefit of notice: if the school has imposed discipline for past speech, students have
been explicitly warned of potential consequences.
Administrators, in effect, measure disruption on the basis of peer reaction.
If there is no reaction, then speech cannot be classified as disruptive, but may simply
be inappropriate. Even if there is disruption, administrators should consider the
140. Cf., Bethel School Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. at 690 (1986) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
141. Taylor, 713 F.3d at 39.
142. Id.
143. See Westfield High Sch. L.I.F.E. Club v. City of Westfield, 249 F.Supp.2d 98, 124–125 (D. Mass.
2003); see also Defoe ex. rel Defoe v. Spiva, 625 F.3d 327 (6th Cir. 2010) (discussing the importance of
series of past events that include racial violence, threats and tension); Sypniewski v. Warren Hills Reg’l
Bd. of Educ., 307 F.3d 243, 256 (3rd Cir. 2002).
144. Burnside v. Byars, 363 F.2d 744, 749 (5th Cir. 1966).
145. Westfield High Sch. L.I.F.E. Club, 249 F.Supp.2d at 111.
146. Defoe ex. rel Defoe, 625 F.3d at 333.
147. Sypniewski, 307 F.3d at 256.
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factual circumstances of the situation. Students may react differently depending on
a variety of factors, including the identity of the speaker, location of speech, time of
day of speech, and any potential incentives to accept or reject the speech. These
factors properly contextualize the magnitude of peer reaction. These suggestions are
a starting point, but the Court should consider several additional factors, with the
ultimate goal of upholding the spirit of Tinker: “specificity and concreteness.”148
III. EXAMPLES
The refinement proposed in this note is derived from 1) explicit guidance
given by various courts in free speech cases and 2) by extracting the factors which
courts use to analyze the nature of disruptive conduct.
Foreseeability of disruption can be refined in order to broaden applicability.
If student speech has a history of causing disruption or inciting violence,
administrators can censor sufficiently similar speech. To substantiate a history, a
school should be able to show a pattern149 of speech as disruptive. A pattern must
require more than one incident at the same school. On a larger scale, a district can
use the similarity analysis150 between schools under its purview to forecast
disruption.151 For this application, a higher standard must be met – more than one
school within a district must have a pattern of incidents to broaden restrictions on
another school. When violence resulting from speech is anticipated, the
administration is not required to adhere to the previous incidents requirement.152
For a proper restriction, speech that does not fall under the foreseeability
standard must be evaluated under substantial and material disruption. Under the latter
standard, speech cannot be censored before it materializes. Once a negative reaction
to the speech manifests, the administration may determine if it may properly restrict
speech by applying the substantial and material disruption standard.153
The substantial and material disruption standard should be turned into a
balancing test of several factors. The four proposed factors are derived from guidance
of the court and areas of contention that arise in school speech cases: 1) speech
intended to isolate, 2) magnitude of peer reaction, 3) location of speech, and 4)
duration. The factors will take on different significance depending on the situation
at hand. Therefore, the importance of each factor can be adjusted. In some instances,
a factor may be inapplicable. Once the applicability of factors is determined,

148. Saxe v. State Coll. Area Sch. Dist., 240 F.3d 200, 212 (3rd Cir. 2001) (citing West v. Derby
Unified Sch. Dist. No. 260, 206 F.3d 1358 (10th Cir. 2000)).
149. Pattern is defined as “The regular and repeated way in which something happens or is done.”
MERRIAM–WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2008).
150. Supra, II.A.
151. Districts are limited to using the similarity analysis between schools within their control. If the
similarity analysis is broadened to schools in neighboring districts or states, the foreseeability standard
risks becoming nebulous. Administrators could search across the nation for speech that fits the similarity
analysis in order to censor their students. This potential problem would negate the need for a history or
pattern of disruptive incidents.
152. Speech indicative of materializing violence can be immediately censored, since not doing so may
result in dire and irreversible consequences.
153. If violent speech is present, administrators reserve the right to censor speech without any analysis
and the substantial and material disruption standard should be disregarded.
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administrators should balance the factors against one another to determine a proper
resolution. This balancing test allows for students to be aware of the disciplinary
standard while simultaneously giving administrators flexibility to maintain
discipline.
A.

Speech Intended to Isolate

Administrators should assess student speech to determine if it discriminates
or has the practical effect of singling out a certain individual or subset of individuals.
Schools have the duty to protect students from abuse or harm while providing an
environment that is conducive to learning.154 Speech not directed at the entirety of a
population has the potential effect of making students feel targeted and unsafe,
leading to distress and a lack of focus on academics.
B.

Magnitude of Peer Reaction

The intensity of acrimony felt by the student body quantifies the substantial
portion of the standard. Administrators should appraise the magnitude of peer
reaction to student speech. Disruption can be caused either in an explicit or in a subtle
manner. Explicitly disruptive speech will have an apparent and easily identifiable
disruptive effect on the student body, causing many students to become agitated.155
Speech with more subtle disruptive effects, such as speech that has the tendency to
incite156 or be objectively provocative, may seem to reach a small number of
students, but because of its character, will later cause considerable disruption.157
C.

Location of Speech

Materiality of the disruption should account for location.158 Student speech
that takes place in a formal teaching and learning environment should be regarded as
more readily disruptive than that which takes place elsewhere.159 When student
speech takes place during a time where learning is explicit, 160 it may more readily
interfere with the school’s mission and its ability to effectively teach pupils. If the
154. Supra, I.C.ii.
155. Explicit disruption would occur if someone dressed in Ku Klux Klan attire walked down the
middle of a hallway at a school where racial tensions existed.
156. See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447–449 (holding that speech which incites or is likely
to incite is punishable); see also Price v. State, 873 P.2d 1049 (Okla. Crim. App. 1994); Noto v. United
States, 367 U.S. 291, 297 (1961); David Crump, Camouflaged Incitement: Freedom of Speech,
Communicative Torts and the Borderland of the Brandenburg Test, 29 GA. L. REV. 1, 11–14 (1994)
(discussing the modern test for analyzing and punishing speech causing incitement).
157. For example, speech actively encouraging a small group of students to wear Ku Klux Klan attire
and begin promoting the division in races at school would later have a likely drastic effect on the school’s
population.
158. Administrators should consider if the speech takes place a classroom, hallway, lunchroom,
parking lot, et cetera.
159. See Nicole Santa Cruz, Lauren Williams & Mike Anton, ‘Irvine 11’: 10 students sentenced to
probation, no jail time, LOS ANGELES TIMES BLOG (Sept. 23, 2011, 2:37 PM),
http://latimesblogs.latimes.com/lanow/2011/09/irvine-11-sentenced-probation-no-jail-time.html
(last
visited Nov. 16, 2014).
160. Explicit learning is when material is taught, such as a presentation, assembly or class.
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speech is outside of a formal teaching environment, it may interfere with the peaceful
atmosphere of the school, but does not necessarily infringe on the school’s academic
mission.
D.

Duration

The duration of disruption should be considered in accord with the location
where the disruption took place. Disruptive speech that occurs during an explicit
learning time should have a short durational requirement. The classroom is a formal
environment and the time when a school performs its most direct and relevant
function – education.161 Except for the teacher, the educational atmosphere is likely
quiet, making any likelihood of distraction by student speech high. Speech that takes
place outside the formal learning environment should have more lenient durational
requirements. Outside of class, students often engage without the constraints
imposed in a learning environment. Students engage in conversation about topics
unrelated to school and are not under the immediate watch of administrators. When
not confined to the learning environment, students have the ability to move locations
and remove themselves from disturbing situations. There is also outside of class for
tension-filled situations to diffuse before resuming learning time. Disruptive speech
outside of the formal learning environment should be given greater leeway.
These factors do not purport to solve every possible situation of school
disruption caused by student speech that has not been pre-approved. These balancing
factors do solve the problem of an unpredictable ad hoc analysis by providing
students with an awareness of restrictions. These factors are not fixed, but exist as a
continuum to serve a wide array of applicability and utility. It is possible that students
will devise ways to get around the rules. When a situation arises that does not fit into
the balancing test, schools should assess those situations independently. Importantly,
schools must consistently apply this regulatory scheme to each incident that arises.162
When factors are equally balanced, the court should look to previous court rulings
and guidance on school speech. This clarification to the substantial and material
disruption standard provides substantive and delineated criteria for the courts,
schools, and students to use.
IV. APPLICATION OF THE NEW STANDARD TO THE FACTS OF
TAYLOR
Applying the balancing factors of the substantial and material disruption
standard to the actual occurrences in Roswell, New Mexico, both the magistrate and
Tenth Circuit courts’ analyses should have been reasoned differently. Foreseeability
is inapplicable to those facts because there was no history of similarly disruptive
incidents, nor did Relentless’ speech threaten to cause violence.

161. Supra, I.C.ii.
162. In Taylor, students were punished when the administration used policies that had previously gone
unenforced. Taylor v. Roswell Indep. Sch. Dist., 713 F.3d 25, 29–33 (10th Cir. 2013).
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Application to Goddard High School

Applying the refined standard to the occurrences at Goddard, the
administration was justified in restricting Relentless’ speech. At Goddard,
Relentless’ speech was not intended to isolate a particular group of people. The
group’s message advocated pro-life beliefs, but dolls were not discriminately
distributed, nor was the speech targeted at students believing in pro-choice.163 Peer
reaction and reporting began when a group of girls approached vice-principal Luck
to voice their agitation.164 According to the record, these girls were the only people
to express their agitation to an administrator before the confiscation began.165 In
addition to the reporting, Mr. Luck observed several students dismembering and
tossing around the dolls, but classroom disruption had not been reported.166 Peer
reaction is characterized by scarce reporting and Mr. Luck’s observation of student
behavior. These occurrences do not raise Relentless’ speech to a high level of peer
reaction.167 Furthermore, the group’s speech was not intended to incite.168 The
disruption observed by Mr. Luck took place in a hallway, not during an explicit
learning time.169 The duration of the disruption in the hallway is unclear – assuming
the dismantling of dolls started when or before Mr. Luck arrived and continued while
he inquired with other administrators and conversed with the upset girls, the
disruption likely lasted ten minutes or more.170 Although disruptions took place
throughout the day, the disruption analysis looks at the situational factors as they
were prior to imposed restraint.171
Prior to Relentless’ censorship, no group was singled out by the student
speech, there was a lack of peer reaction, and the disruption took place in the hallway
for a significant amount of time. Here, the factors seem to be equally balanced. The
balancing test would have clearly weighed in Goddard’s favor if the level of peer
reaction at the time of restriction were greater. The factors are equally weighed, so
the court should look at prior rulings and court statements about school speech to
decide if restriction was appropriate. In this instance, the court has stated that active
student speech is more likely to be restricted than passive speech.172 Therefore,
Goddard administration was correct in restricting Relentless’ doll distribution.
B.

Application to Roswell High School

In contrast, application of the refined standard to the occurrences at Roswell
reveals that the administration was unjustified to restrict Relentless’ speech. Roswell
was put on alert regarding disruption from Goddard.173 However, Roswell could not
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.

But see, supra, III.A.
Taylor v. Roswell Indep. Sch. Dist., 713 F.3d 25, 31 (10th Cir. 2013).
Id.
Id. at 30–31.
But see, supra, III.B.
But see, supra, note 155.
Taylor v. Roswell Indep. Sch. Dist., 713 F.3d at 30–31; see, supra III.C.
See supra, III.D.
See supra, note 126.
Supra, I.C.iv.
Taylor v. Roswell Indep. Sch. Dist., 713 F.3d 25, 31 (10th Cir. 2013).
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use the disruption at Goddard as foreseeably disruptive because Goddard 1) had no
previous problems with Relentless and 2) had not experienced any previously
disruptive incidents that would allow for restriction based on similarity. The
incidents at Roswell therefore need to be analyzed as a novel incident of disruption.
Relentless’ speech was not directed at a distinct group or disseminated with
the intent of student isolation.174 Rather, Relentless members aimed to reach the
entire student body by giving a doll to each student they encountered. There were no
complaints of disruption voiced by students and the record lacks references to
teachers’ being upset over disruptive classroom conduct resulting from the dolls.175
Rather, an absent principal instructed a security guard to confiscate the dolls when
he believed the distribution was causing a disruption to the educational process.176
Although distribution occurred outside of the classroom,177 the record indicates that
the security guard observed disruptive conduct occurring inside the classroom.178
Once he saw this, he immediately confiscated the dolls.179
A key problem with the situation at Roswell was that a security guard, not
an administrator, was delegated the task of assessing the situation and imposing
restrictions. Relentless’ speech was not intended to isolate and the magnitude of peer
reaction was minimal. Although there was disruption in the classroom, the dolls were
confiscated immediately and not after a short duration. First, administrators should
have been in charge of restrictions, since they are in a position to determine when
education is being disrupted. Second, the confiscation should not have taken place
immediately, but given a short span of time to determine if the problem would correct
itself. These factors as applied to the occurrences at Roswell weigh in favor of
Relentless. Roswell administrators did not act reasonably or correctly when they
censored Relentless’ speech.
C.

How to Reach an Opposite Conclusion at Goddard High School

The facts in Taylor can be altered to demonstrate how the court would arrive
at a conclusion opposite from what was previously discussed. At Goddard, assume
that Relentless’ speech remained untargeted at a specific audience and that peer
reaction was minimal.180 If Relentless had distributed dolls during lunch181 and
students took the dolls back to their lockers, or threw them away, the possibility of
disrupting class182 would be minimal and speech would not fall under appropriate
restriction. The safest way for Relentless to distribute their items without causing a
disruption to the educational process would be to distribute the dolls after school
ended. This would safeguard against the possibility of disruption to the learning

174.
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.
182.

But see, supra, III.A.
But see, supra, III.B.
Taylor v. Roswell Indep. Sch. Dist., 713 F.3d 25, 31 (10th Cir. 2013).
See supra, III.C.
Castro Dep. 4: 8–13, March 2, 2011; TR–1; see, supra, III.C.
Castro Dep. 29: 17–24, March 2, 2011; TR–29; but see, supra, III.D.
But see, supra, III.A; but cf., supra, III.B.
But see, supra, III.C.
See supra, III.C; but see, supra, III.D.
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environment later that day. Under these hypothetical circumstances, which limit
possibility of disruption, Goddard would have no basis to restrict student speech.
D.

How to Reach an Opposite Conclusion at Roswell High School

At Roswell, administrators should have waited longer before commencing
the doll confiscation. Assume that the Relentless’ speech remained untargeted.183
However, if the time lapse was more significant184 in either a classroom or a nonlearning environment,185 peer reaction could have risen to a higher level186 allowing
for a likely materialization of full disruption. Although not imperative to the outcome
of the case, an administrator should have been implementing the balancing disruption
test, rather than using the discretion of a staff member.187 These factual changes
would lead the court to conclude that Roswell appropriately restricted its students’
speech.
New Mexico courts and the Tenth Circuit should apply the balancing test
version of the substantial and material disruption standard. Once schools and courts
establish consistency in applying the standard, there will be a reduction in school
speech cases because the clear standard will minimize disputes.
V. COUNTERARGUMENTS
A.

Schools Do Not Have A Singular Purpose

The balancing factors serve to primarily prohibit disruptive speech in
explicit learning environments. However, education is not the sole purpose of a
school environment. Schools also serve to build well-rounded individuals. Traits that
contribute to forming a balanced individual are not solely found in the classroom.188
Many experiences that students have in the hallways, cafeteria, and parking lot are
also important for student growth.
The factors place a lower threshold for disruption in an explicit learning
environment since education is the main reason for attending school.189 It can be
argued that an individual cannot gain the proper benefits of an education if not
exposed to explicit learning environments. Character traits that are manifested
outside of explicit learning can be gained in other arenas – such as club sports, music
lessons, and camp. Explicit learning is a fragile and unique entity whose benefits
cannot be found elsewhere.

183. But see, supra, III.A.
184. See supra, III.D.
185. See supra, III.C.
186. See supra, III.B.
187. Administrators hold a distinguished role as supervisor and leader of the school. As part of these
duties, administrators are trusted to carry out the mission of the school and are most qualified to evaluate
when that is or is not being done.
188. See Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629, 633–634 (1950) (discussing the qualities of a school that
make for a high quality experience, including size of student body and traditions).
189. See supra, III.D.
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Students Will Bypass the Standard

Students may look at the proposed factors and attempt to devise ways to
avoid their applicability. The factors attempt to use measurements that cannot be
easily manipulated. For example, peer reaction190 will be hard for a student or group
of students to control. Students will likely be unable to predict the reaction of each
student in the school population. It is also challenging to anticipate how long a
disruption will last.191 Speakers may limit the duration of their message, but they will
not be able to place limits on how their speech is received or on the length of others’
reactions. Importantly, this is the first in-depth clarification of the substantial and
material disruption standard. As it is applied, courts may find the need to adjust
accordingly by altering, adding, or deleting factors from the balancing test.
C.

Smaller Numbers Suffer in Favor of the Masses

The peer reaction factor requires that a significant number of students be
affected by the disruptive speech. If a small group of people or individuals are
bothered, they will not be able to use this component to their benefit. A potential
solution may be found under the “speech intended to isolate” factor.192 However, if
this factor does not apply to the disruptive speech, then the small group may not be
able to find a resolution to their acrimony. It is important to note that the very essence
of this standard is meant to address substantial disruptions. If a bothersome situation
is unable to fit into this framework to meet the “substantial” criteria, then other
avenues for resolution need to be pursued.
VI. CONCLUSION
This note recognizes the lack of clarity surrounding the Tinker substantial
and material disruption standard for school speech. In Tinker, there was no disruptive
conduct. There, the court failed to delineate criteria to analyze future school
disruptions. Subsequent courts have taken the vague standard and implemented it as
an unpredictable ad hoc analysis. This lack of clarity frustrates students’ First
Amendment rights.
Courts are wary of overstepping the judiciary boundary and interfering with
schools. This caution causes courts to defer to school administrative judgment,
reasoning that administrators know the school intimately and are in the best position
to determine what will cause disorder. Often, as in Taylor, administrators are unable
to articulate a coherent and consistent standard of what should be classified as a
disruption. This unspecified ad hoc standard does not provide students with an
adequate notion of what is or what is not prohibited. Rather, permissible speech is to
be decided on a whim.
This note suggests that the substantial and material disruption standard be
refined to a four-factor balancing test: 1) speech intended to isolate, 2) magnitude of
peer reaction, 3) location of speech, and 4) duration. These factors have been
identified based on explicit guidance given by various courts dealing with school
190. See supra, III.B.
191. See supra, III.D.
192. See supra, III.A.
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speech and 2) by extracting factors which are used to analyze the nature of disruptive
conduct.
This proposal provides a clear and succinct way to analyze disruptive school
speech. Through the use of this proposal, students retain their First Amendment
rights and become aware of what types of speech are prohibited. Administrators will
also benefit by saving resources (time, attention, etc.) and dealing with less
controversy.
In particular, the Tenth Circuit should take notice of the confusion posed by
the current Tinker standard. It is clear through the conflated analysis used in Taylor,
that even the court has a tendency to confuse the standard when attempting to apply
it. This proposal does not purport to be effective for every instance of disruptive
school conduct. However, this is the first academic attempt to clarify and refine
Tinker.

